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The BSAI fishing grounds are among the most productive in the world, and the groundfish fishery is 
important commercially. Over 90% of the groundfish catch is harvested by pelagic and bottom trawl gear 
(NPMFC, 2010). In 2008, managers implemented a Cooperative catch share program for the 28 non-
pollock trawl vessels, known as the Amendment 80 fleet. This sector targets six BSAI groundfish species: 
yellowfin sole (Pleuronectes asper), rock sole (Lepidopsetta bilineata), flathead sole (Hippoglossoides 
elassodon), Atka mackerel (Pleurogrammus monopterygius), Pacific Ocean perch (Sebastes alutus) and 
Pacific cod (Gadus macrocephalus). The National Marine Fishery Service (NMFS) manages this fishery 
with consultation from the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC). In 2010, program 
Cooperatives landed approximately 181,000 metric tons of groundfish worth U.S. $278.2 million  
(NPFMC, 2012).
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MULTI-SPECIES, GROUP-ALLOCATED, 
QUOTA-BASED, TRANSFERABLE
The Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) Non-Pollock (Amendment 80) Cooperative Program was 
one of the first catch share programs designed and implemented to manage fishing interactions 
with a non-target species. The goals of the program were largely focused on reducing bycatch to 
enable the fleet to achieve higher retention of groundfish resources. In this program, participants 
were incentivized to form Cooperatives to receive exclusive access privileges. Key design elements 
for this program include eligibility requirements, government-approved Cooperative formation, 
concentration caps, trading restrictions and sideboards, which are catch limits that restrict the 
transfer of excess fishing capacity to other fisheries not managed under catch shares. 
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Road to a Catch Share
The BSAI groundfish fishery developed over the last century, with a significant degree of foreign trawl fishing 
driving its early development. Between 1976 and 1990, foreign fleets were barred from the exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) in all U.S. fisheries, which enabled domestic participation to grow significantly. To limit overcapacity, 
managers implemented a limited license program (LLP) in 2000. However, while the LLP capped the number of 
participants, it did not limit the amount of fishing effort, and problems began to escalate within the fishery. 
High rates of discards and premature season closures became characteristic of the non-pollock trawl fishery 
in the years leading up to catch share implementation. As fishermen raced to maximize their catch, discard 
rates increased, reaching up to 30% of the catch limit (Fina, 2011; NMFS, 2011). Early season closures became 
a regular occurrence as trawlers reached the limits of Prohibited Species Catch (PSC) of halibut, red king crab, 
tanner crab and snow crab. Fleets lost significant economic opportunity under this system as fisheries closed 
before they could harvest all of their target species (J. Anderson and L. Swanson, personal communication, 
2011).
Managers recognized the need to address the prevailing incentives that were failing the fishery. In 2008, the 
NPFMC developed the BSAI Non-Pollock Cooperative Program, also known as Amendment 80. The program is a 
limited access privilege program that allocates Quota Shares for six groundfish species to eligible trawl catcher-
processor vessels. Operators of those vessels are allowed to form harvesting Cooperatives. The program focuses 
on creating economic incentives to reduce discards and bycatch to minimize the negative impacts on adjacent 
fisheries.
Performance 
Five years since implementation, the BSAI Non-Pollock Cooperative Program is considered a highly successful 
catch share program (Anderson and Concepcion, 2010). The program has met its goals of increasing groundfish 
retention and reducing bycatch of halibut, enabling fishermen to harvest a more complete share of target 
species (BUC, 2009). Fishermen report that the catch share program allows them to slow the pace of their fishing 
operations and to selectively target fishing grounds. The Cooperative structure has also led to social innovations 
among members to improve groundfish retention (Hiatt et al., 2010; Fina, 2011). 
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STEP 1 IN ACTION
Define Program Goals
The BSAI Non-Pollock Cooperative Program was implemented under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act (MSA). As such, the program was designed to meet the legal requirements 
regarding stock sustainability and ecological, economic and social goals. Biological goals prescribed in the 
National Standards (NS) One, Three and Nine of the MSA (16 U.S.C. 1851) are:
NS1 - Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing 
basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United States fishing industry.
NS3 - To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit throughout its range, 
and interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination.
NS9 - Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, (A) minimize bycatch and (B) 
to the extent bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the mortality of such bycatch.
During the catch share program’s development, managers and fishermen identified a variety of goals to improve 
the biological and economic conditions of the fishery to accompany the legal requirements under the MSA. The 
goals identified for the program are (Federal Register, 2007; NPMFC, 2010):
t Reduce bycatch and create individual accountability for bycatch reduction
t Increase economic returns by enhancing operational efficiency and enabling more complete harvests of 
target species 
t Allocate resources in an equitable manner that is based on present and historical harvesting patterns
t Minimize negative impacts on participants of adjacent fisheries that are not managed by a catch share
STEP 2 IN ACTION
Define and Quantify the Available Resource
Defining and quantifying the available resource was largely driven by pre-existing management structures, as 
laid out by the BSAI Fishery Management Plan (NPFMC, 2010). The BSAI Non-Pollock Cooperative Program 
allocates privileges for six non-pollock groundfish species among trawl fishery sectors. They are: yellowfin sole 
(Pleuronectes asper), rock sole (Lepidopsetta bilineata), flathead sole (Hippoglossoides elassodon), Atka mackerel 
(Pleurogrammus monopterygius), Pacific Ocean perch (Sebastes alutus) and Pacific cod (Gadus macrocephalus). 
Flatfish (yellowfin sole, rock sole and flathead sole) exist throughout the Bering Sea shelf and share similar 
habitat. Atka mackerel and Pacific Ocean perch are mostly targeted by vessels that operate in the Aleutian 
Islands, where these species are in higher abundance. Pacific cod is typically caught throughout the entire BSAI 
range (NPFMC, 2010). The BSAI is divided into two subareas, the Bering Sea and the Aleutian Islands. Annual 
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Stock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation (SAFE) reports are used to determine the annual catch limits for these 
Amendment 80 species.
The non-pollock fleet operates within fishing grounds that overlap with adjacent fisheries, resulting in 
interactions with other fleets and non-target species, and leading to high rates of bycatch and discards. To 
minimize participation and impact on adjacent fisheries’ stocks, the catch share program imposes sideboard 
and prohibited species limits. Sideboard limits were established for Gulf of Alaska (GOA) pollock, Pacific cod, 
Pacific Ocean perch, northern rockfish and pelagic shelf rockfish (e.g., dusky rockfish). Sideboards seek to limit 
participation in GOA to historical levels in order to prevent fishermen from increasing their participation in 
other fisheries as a result of increased efficiency in the Amendment 80 fleet (Federal Register, 2007). Halibut 
(Hippoglossus stenolepis), red king crab (Paralithodes camtschatica), tanner crab (Chinocetes bairdi) and snow 
crab (C. opilio) are prohibited species, which means they must be discarded by participants. 
To address groundfish discards, managers implemented a Groundfish Retention Standard (GRS) that required 
all vessels retain a percentage of their groundfish bycatch. The retention standard was set at 65% at the start of 
the program and increased to 85% in 2011 (Federal Register, 2007). However, the GRS requirement was removed 
in 2013 as it was found to be unmanageable due to monitoring costs and significantly higher-than-predicted 
compliance costs. In exchange, Cooperatives are now responsible to hire a third-party auditor to determine 
groundfish retention for inclusion in the required annual reports (Federal Register, 2013).
STEP 3 IN ACTION
Define Eligible Participants
In order to meet the program’s goals of reducing bycatch and increasing economic efficiency, the program 
allocates exclusive privileges to groups. Trawl catcher-processor vessel owners who hold an LLP license can 
voluntarily form a Cooperative, which is then eligible to receive quota. At program implementation, 28 permits 
were eligible for allocation (Federal Register, 2007).1
During program design, strict regulations were implemented for the formation of eligible Cooperatives. 
Cooperatives could form only with participation from at least nine out of the 28 eligible permits. Since some 
fishing corporations hold multiple permits, Cooperatives were also required to be comprised of a minimum of 
three separate quota-share-holding corporations (Federal Register, 2011). Permit holders choosing not join a 
Cooperative were not allocated secure shares and were allowed to fish in a competitive limited access fishery. 
Starting in 2011, operators with multiple vessels could not have vessels in both the Cooperative fishery and a 
limited access fishery (Federal Register, 2011). Cooperative membership is established prior to the fishing season 
each year and members cannot move between Cooperatives within a fishing season, but may do so during the 
off-season.
During the first three years of the program, the Alaska Seafood Cooperative was the only Cooperative to form. 
It began with participation from 17 member vessels owned by five corporations. The remaining eight permits 
1   Remote Western Alaskan communities are eligible to receive Amendment 80 species allocations under the Community Development Quota (CDQ) program, established 
in 1998 (Hiatt et al., 2010). To be considered eligible, communities must not have previously developed commercial-scale harvesting or processing capacity. These 
communities are able to participate in the fishery by entering into a part-ownership relationship with one or more of the BSAI companies holding Amendment 80 permits, for 
which they receive royalty payments on their apportioned share (NPMFC, 2010).
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were assigned to the Amendment 80 limited access fishery, as there was an insufficient number to form a 
second Cooperative. Three years after program implementation, another amendment was approved that 
reduced Cooperative requirements to seven eligible permits holders and two separate quota sharing entities. 
The amendment also banned corporations from splitting permits between the Cooperative and limited access 
fisheries. This change drove a majority of vessels to join Cooperatives. The newly formed Cooperatives included 
all of the remaining vessels, except for one that had very limited fishing history in the Bering Sea, and eliminated 
the limited access fishery for non-pollock groundfish species (J. Anderson, personal communication, 2011). 
To prevent fleet consolidation and retain historical fishing patterns, concentration limits were included in 
program design. Concentration limits were set to prevent industry consolidation at both the corporation and 
vessel level, while allowing for some efficiency gains to be made in order to reduce costs, such as for monitoring 
and enforcement. Within the program, no single person or corporation can hold or use more than 30% of the 
Quota Share, unless it is grandfathered in based on historical participation, and no vessel may fish more than 
20% of the quota allocated to the Amendment 80 sector (Federal Register, 2007). 
New entrants to the fishery must meet complex eligibility requirements defined for the fishery. Under certain 
conditions fishermen may enter by buying an LLP license and Quota Share from one of the current Amendment 
80 participants. 
STEP 4 IN ACTION
Define the Privilege
The BSAI Non-Pollock Cooperative Program allocated quota-based privileges. The long-term allocations, called 
Quota Shares, were granted indefinitely to eligible participants and are attached to each participant’s vessel. 
To create an incentive for Cooperative formation, managers only allow use of Quota Shares when a vessel is a 
Cooperative member. 
At the beginning of each season, the formed Cooperative is allocated the annual allocation unit, called 
Cooperative Quota. Cooperative Quota is calculated from the sum of all Quota Shares held by the current 
Cooperative membership and based upon the annual catch limits set for each species. 
Quota Shares cannot be leased, and permanent transfers of an eligible vessel (including the associated catch 
history) can only be made to new entrants who are defined as eligible under the program (NPFMC, 2010). 
Inter- and intra-Cooperative transfers are allowed within the program to facilitate the goal of economic 
efficiency and to keep the Cooperative accountable to catch limits. Within Cooperatives, members agree upon 
how quota will be allocated amongst themselves, according to Cooperative bylaws. Cooperative members are 
able to transfer Cooperative Quota before and after trips and are subject to the approval of the Cooperative 
manager. Intra-Cooperative transfers happen often, both between licenses within the same company and 
between licenses owned by two different companies (J. Anderson, personal communication, 2011). Cooperative 
Quota can be transferred between Cooperatives both before and after fishing trips to help cover accidental 
overages. All transfers between Cooperatives must first be approved by NMFS. 
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STEP 5 IN ACTION
Assign the Privilege
Managers were committed to assigning the privileges in an equitable manner based on present and historical  
harvesting patterns. To best attain this goal, a two-level allocation process was established for the Amendment 
80 fleet. First, fishery managers granted privileges to individual vessel permits based upon catch history. Then, 
Cooperatives were allowed to make internal allocation decisions to reflect current harvesting strategies.
Initial Quota Share allocations were made by NMFS to eligible vessels with an LLP license. These allocations 
were based upon the five best years of catch history between 1998 and 2004. Individual bycatch allocations 
for prohibited species, including crab species and halibut, are proportional to Quota Share allocations and 
not based upon catch history (Federal Register, 2007). An appeals process enabled license holders to request a 
review of their allocation. This process is run through the NMFS National Appeals Office, which separates the 
appeals process from the initial allocation decisions. 
Each season before allocations are made to Cooperatives in the Amendment 80 fleet:
t 10.7% of the catch limit for all Amendment 80 species is allocated to the CDQ program (Federal Register, 
2007)
t Managers allocate incidental catch allowance of Amendment 80 species to other target fisheries in other 
sectors to account for all sources of mortality
t A portion of the yellowfin sole, Atka mackerel and Pacific Ocean perch are allocated to the BSAI trawl 
limited access sector (American Fisheries Act catcher-processors and trawl catcher vessels)2
The remaining allocations are then distributed entirely to the Amendment 80 sector. 
STEP 6 IN ACTION
Develop Administrative Systems
A detailed administrative system has been designed and implemented to ensure real-time catch accounting and 
robust monitoring and enforcement. The Restricted Access Management (RAM) division of NMFS administers 
the program. RAM uses online administration systems to determine the eligibility of participants, allocate Quota 
Shares, process Cooperative applications and inter-Cooperative Quota Share transfers, collect landing fees and 
conduct other related activities. 
Cooperatives are held accountable through internal administrative systems established by Cooperative bylaws 
and agreements. Internal Cooperative arrangements also determine how Cooperative Quota allocations will 
be made to members to fish (this is unlike individual annual allocations to vessels, which NMFS administers). 
2 Currently, all Amendment 80 vessels that have applied for Quota Share are in Cooperatives, therefore the Amendment 80 limited access sector is not in operation. 
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Once Cooperative membership is determined for the season, Cooperative allocations are made based on the 
sum of member Quota Shares and can vary between Cooperatives. For example, the Alaska Seafood Cooperative 
first allocates quota to a quota reserve, then makes allocations to Cooperative members that reflect the Quota 
Shares each vessel brings into the Cooperative (J. Anderson, personal communication, 2011). The quota reserve 
provides a buffer against accidentally exceeding quota, and vessels must acquire member approval prior to 
using their quota in the reserve (BUC, 2009). 
Discards were a large concern in the fishery prior to catch share implementation, and therefore an extensive 
monitoring system was developed for the program. Monitoring includes vessel monitoring systems (VMS),  
a requirement of two on-board observers for every trip with coverage on all hauls, motion-compensating 
scales for weighing samples, flow scales to obtain accurate catch-weight estimates for the entire catch and 
prohibitions on mixing of hauls and on-deck sorting (Wilderbuer et al., 2010). The on-board observers verify 
catch composition and quantity and collect biological information on marine resources. The on-board observer 
program is managed by the Fisheries Monitoring and Analysis Division of the Alaska Fisheries Science Center 
and has significantly improved managers’ ability to estimate and enforce quota of bycatch species and allocated 
target species (Hiatt et al., 2010). 
Catch accounting requires that each vessel in the fishery track information including daily catch receipts, 
product transfer reports, recorded cargo transfer reports and off-loading information. Catch accounts are 
established in the Alaska Region’s Catch Accounting System, which provides near real-time delivery of 
accurate data for in-season management decisions. Data from industry are reported through the Electronic 
Reporting System and fed hourly into the NMFS database. Data from observers are sent electronically to the 
Alaska Fisheries Science Center and transmitted daily into the Catch Accounting System. These data are used 
to calculate quota debits from Amendment 80 vessels and Cooperatives (NPFMC, 2010). Participants use 
eLandings, an interagency electronic reporting system, to report all commercial fishery landings off Alaska. 
Many parties are involved in the oversight of the Cooperative program, and members are held accountable 
through multiple channels within the Cooperative. Corporation owners, vessel captains, crew and other 
company personnel participate in the management process and together develop a Cooperative agreement 
that outlines harvest strategies, harvest shares and compliance provisions. For example, the Alaska Seafood 
Cooperative appoints a Cooperative manager to oversee day-to-day operations. Responsibilities include: 
ensuring communication among the fleet, member companies and Cooperative staff; ensuring compliance 
with the Cooperative agreement; ensuring harvest shares are distributed in a timely and accurate manner; 
and applying for annual Cooperative Quota allocations. The Alaska Seafood Cooperative also appoints a data 
manager to oversee all Cooperative monitoring activities, ensure that government requirements are met and 
make certain that Cooperative members acquire timely updates on their quota accounts. 
Cooperative members pay for monitoring activities and other Cooperative services. The program was initially 
implemented without a cost recovery program in place, as NPFMC was unclear as to whether cost recovery 
regulations applied to Cooperative allocations. Upon subsequent review of the MSA, the development of a cost 
recovery program is now underway (G. Merrill, personal communication, 2011).
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STEP 7 IN ACTION
Assess Performance and Innovate
A formal review of the program is to occur five years after program implementation to inform future 
management decisions. Fishery managers also designed a socioeconomic survey to help improve understanding 
of the program’s effects on vessels and entities regulated by the catch share (Federal Register, 2011). To date, the 
overall program review has not been released. 
It is clear, however, that the program has worked exceedingly well. The program has successfully met many 
of its goals, including ending the race for fish. Harvesting has slowed, allowing fishermen to better maximize 
harvests of the target species while reducing discards and avoiding bycatch of halibut and crab. Due to trawl 
gear innovations, there has been a decrease in bycatch and habitat damage through reducing bottom contact 
by 90% (Anderson and Concepcion, 2011). This achievement has contributed to the Marine Stewardship 
Council’s certification of every species in the flatfish fishery, which the Cooperatives believe will support market 
development in high quality, sustainable seafood products (MSC, 2010). 
The program has also been integral to encouraging Cooperative innovation in overcoming management 
challenges associated with a multi-species fishery. Cooperatives were able to create a viable and innovative 
alternative to the cumbersome retention policy. Cooperatives currently enforce groundfish retention in parallel 
with an accompanying third party audit to provide transparency (J. Anderson, personal communication, 
2011). Through this innovation, groundfish discards have successfully been reduced and the capital intensive 
Groundfish Retention Standard policy has been discontinued. Cooperatives have also played an important role 
in the implementation of gear modifications that have helped reduce halibut bycatch. Cooperatives have been 
collaborating with NMFS to explore ways to allow for accurate observer accounting on deck so crew can discard 
halibut while still alive, which would reduce mortality (BUC, 2009). Cooperatives have also devised innovative 
solutions to discrete challenges, such as when the fishery received small allocations of Pacific cod, constraining 
the ability to harvest other groundfish species (L. Swanson, personal communication, 2011). To address this 
challenge, most Cooperative members now fish for Pacific cod only at the end of the season to avoid overages 
(Anderson and Concepcion, 2011).
The catch share program has resulted in some consolidation of fishing effort to save operating and monitoring 
costs, and this has generally occurred among vessels that are owned by the same company. The program 
has meanwhile provided increased economic stability for communities by bringing steadier employment 
opportunities to shipyards (J. Anderson, personal communication, 2011). Before the catch share, vessel captains 
had to conduct maintenance at the same time as other vessels during season closures. This forced shipyard 
managers to engage additional temporary employees during the short busy period. When the Non-Pollock 
Cooperative Program was implemented, vessel holders gained the ability to choose when to conduct annual 
shipyard maintenance, allowing for shipyards to better accommodate the industry’s schedule while providing 
more consistent employment within the community (J. Anderson, personal communication, 2011). 
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